




The deregulation ofdepositrates hitwestern
banks and savings and loan associations
with full force in 1983. Two developments,
in particular, virtually swept away the struc-
ture ofdeposit rate regulation and, in the
process, dramatically restructured the bal-
ance sheets ofdepository institutions. First
came the introduction ofthe money market
deposit account (MMDA) in mid-December
1982 and the Super-NOW in January 1983.
Second, the deregulation ofall new time
deposits with original maturitiesgreaterthan
31 days followed in October. Depositors'
response to these actions was unequivocal:
billions ofdollars flowed into these new
accounts (especially the MMDA) out of
lower-yielding regulated accounts and
uninsured money market mutual funds.
This deregulation ofdeposit accounts
coupled with weak loan demand greatly
intensified competition among depository
institutions. The tremendous inflowoffunds
to MMDA accounts, in particular, induced
banks and S&Ls aggressively to seek out
profitable lending opportunities. Because
the demand for business and, to some
extent, real estate loans, continued
to be weak, they concentrated on consumer
lending.
Increased competition notwithstanding,
many depository institutions in this region
managed to post significant gains in earn-
ings. There were, however, some major
differences among institutions and between
the banking and thrift industries generally.
While most banks reported solid earnings
gains for 1983, sizeable losses sustained by
several ofthem lowered aggregate earnings
for all western banks from $1.5 billion in
1982 to $1.3 billion. In contrast, savings and
loan associations recorded a phenomenal
turnaround in profitability, posting $1.1
billion in earnings after adisastrous $805
million loss in 1982.Thus, although industry
analysts predicted that deregulation would
play havoc with banks' and thrifts' cost of
funds, many depository institutions in the
West demonstrated a remarkable ability to
managetherisks introduced by deregulation.
Shifting market shares
By year-end, ithad become apparent that a
major factor in adepository institution's
abilityto build market share for retail
savings-type deposits was its willingness to
offer premium rates for MMDA deposits in
the earlygoing. This market, estimated to be
about $250 billion, includes balances held
in savings accounts, small-denomination
time deposits, personal MMDAs and money
market mutual fund shares that are pur-
chased by households in the West. Thus, by
initially offering above-market yields on
MMDAs, the banking industry emerged as
the clear leader in the MMDA battle in the
West and in the nation. Its generally more
aggressive pricing strategies induced house-
holdsto sever existing deposit relationships
with less aggressive institutions. And once
households moved theirfunds, they showed
little inclination to shop around for slightly
higher yields.
By capturing 54 percent ofthe personal
MMDA market, western banks' share ofthe
overall retail savings deposit market rose
by three percentage points to 45 percent.
Meanwhile, savi ngs and loans, mutual
savings banks, and creditunionsintheWest
all lost market share but were still able to
attract significant new inflows with MMDAs
because ofgrowthin the market. The money
market funds, on the other hand, lost not
only market share, but also suffered signif-
icant net outflowsoffunds.
Funding with MMDAs
The introduction ofthe MMDA in late 1982
produced a sharp change in the structure of
depository institutions' balance sheets. For
example, by year-end, western banks held
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held $35 billion, In both cases, MMDAs
accounted for more than one-fifth oftotal
domestic deposits by the end ofthe year,
As much as one-third of these funds were
"new" moneythat enabled theseinstitu-
tions to reduce their reliance on "purchased
funds" such as large denomination nego-
tiable CDs, fed funds and repurchase agree-'
ments. At western banks, forexample, large
CDs outstanding declined from 32 percent
to 20 percent ofliabilities, The success of
the MMDAs, however, was notcostless, as
western banks and S&Ls also reported a $14
billion decline in 5.25 percent passbook
savings deposits,
Slow asset growth
The influx ofMMDA funds sent banks and
S&Ls scramblingto find profitable lending
opportunities in 1983, butprivate credit
demand remained weak and kept down-
ward pressure on loan rates. Nonetheless,
western savings and loan associations
recorded a dramatic 19 percent increase in
their loan portfolios. Western banks, by
contrast, recorded aslight contraction in
their foreign loan portfolios ($56 billion at
year-end) and a modest 5 percent gain (to
$200 billion) in their domestic loans.
Paradoxically, improvement in the overall
level ofeconomic activity had a chilling
effect on western banks' commerical and
industrial lending. The general reduction in
interest rates from their 1982 levels and the
consequent improvement in the debt and
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equity markets during much ofthe year
allowed many corporations to reduce their
dependence on short-term bank borrowing.
The economic rebound also improved busi-
nesses' cash flows and profits, and thereby
reduced their need for external financing.
In addition, there was littleevidence of
increased'demand for capital projectfinanc-
ing as capital expenditures were slowto pick
updespite major cutbacks duringthe reces-
sion. Overall, then, western banks recorded
a meager (3.5 percent) increase in domestic
commercial and industrialloans($65 billion
at year-end).
Western consumers' renewed interest in
housing and consumer durables, by contrast,
translated into increased demand for mort-
gage and installment credit. Much ofthe
strength in the residential mortgage market
'reflected the increased popularity ofsecond
mortgages, thedesireofrecent purchasersto
refinance at lower rates, and increased
usage ofadjustable-rate-mortgages. Savings
and loan associations extended the).ipn's
share ofmortgage credit in the West. Their
mortgage loans outstanding grew by 17
percent in 1983 and theiroriginations
exceeded $45 billion for the year, while
western banks' real estate loans outstanding
grewonly 3 percent to $73 billion.
Consumer credit provided one ofthe more
attractive lending markets in 1983-
particularly for western banks. Timed with
the rise in consumer spending on durable
goods, banks' efforts to promote install-
ment and credit card loan products pro-
duced the first sustained increase in western
banks' consumer lending since 1979.
Although still modest, the $1.5 billion
(6 percent rate) increase in consumer loans
during 1983 ($34 billion at year-end) was
significant given the keen competition
in this market from finance companies and
thrifts.
Earnings in 1983
Earnings ofwestern banks and S&Ls fared
remarkably well in the new, deregulatedenvironmentof1983. MMDAsand other
deregulated deposit productsenabled banks
and thrifts to reduce their reliance on
higher-cost purchased funds. Moreover, the
general decline in the level of interest rates
produced a slight improvement in western
banks' net interest margins and a substantial
improvement in those ofS&Ls.
For banks, the lower level of interest rates
and weak creditdemand in 1983 reduced
interest income substantially. Western
banks recorded reductions in revenues from
overseas investments (down 30 percent),
domesticlending(down 15 percent) and fed
funds sales (down 20 percent). Only interest
income from securities holdings showed an
increase (5 percent), reflecting the large
build-upofu.s. Treasurysecurities holdings
early in the year. However, the decline in
interest rates also reduced banks' interest
expense.
On balance, interest expense fell more
sharply than interest income, producing
aslight improvementin net interestmargins.
Changes in banks' funding mix also helped
lowerthe cost offunds. Thus, the combina-
tion of lower rates and reduced reliance on
purchased funds enabled banks to reduce
their interest expense on large time deposits
by 50 percent and theiroffshore borrowing
expense by one-third.
This modest improvement in interest
margins, however, was not sufficient to
offset the costs associated with the rapid
deterioration in overall credit quality. Loan
loss provisions were boosted by 50 percent
in the West to handle the anticipated loan
chargeoffs-particularly loans to less-
developed countries and energy-related
loans.
The main source ofearnings growth for
western banks, then, was the sharp increase
in non-interest incorne, particularly from
fees earned on deposit services. As deposit
interest rates were deregulated, banks raised
fees to recoup the costofproviding services
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thatwere formerly offered to customers
without charge. Thus, fee income as well
as fiduciary income rose by more than 25
percent.
By contrast, most ofthe savings and loan
associations' remarkable 39 percent
increase in net worth during1983 was due
not to a rise in non-interest income, but
to a substantial improvement in interest
margins. S&Ls enjoyed the same reduction
in interest expense as banks, butbecause
oftheir large fixed rate mortgage loan port-
folios, did notsuffer the same erosion
in interest income. Moreover, S&Ls' loan
losses were less problematic than those
ofbanks.
The outlook for 1984
Loan growth in 1984 is likely to improve
with the continued recovery-particularly
in the area ofcommercial and industrial
lending. The deregulation ofdeposit rates
will allow banks and S&Ls to obtain suffi-
cient funds to finance these increased credit
demands profitably. Moreover, the in-
creased investment and lending powers that
have been granted S&Ls in recent years will
enable them, like banks, tohedge better
against changes in interest rates. Finally,
as the last vestiges ofregulated deposit
products are swept away, banks and thrifts
will face increasing pressure to trim non-
interest expenses, such as large branch
networks, while recovering the costs of
providing retail banking services.
Gary Zimmerman and
Barbara Bennett1006
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loans, leasesand Investments] 2 175,290 1,409 1,844 1.1
Loans and.leases1 5 154,979 1,381 3,186 2.1
Commercial and Industrial 45,389 223 - 140 - 0.3
Real estate 59,022 80 1,094 1.9
Loans to Individuals 26,655 5 2,100 7.9
Leases 5,019 - 20 - 307 - 5.8
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 12,208 69 653 5.3
Other Securities2 8,103 - 41 NA NA
Total Deposits 185,308 3,360 NA NA
Demand Deposits 44,005 3,511 NA NA
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,050 912 NA NA
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,059 359 NA NA
Total Non~Transaction Balances 129,244 - 151 NA NA
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total 39,636 - 56 NA NA
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 38,167 - 289 - 8,645 - 18.5
Otherliabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 19,599 466 - 3,696 15.9
Weekly Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency (-)
Borrowings
















1 Includes, loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowing via FRS, IT&l notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other.sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
Editorialcommentsmaybeaddressed totheeditor(GregoryTong) ortotheauthor....freecopiesof
Fedetal Reserve publications can be obtained from the'Public Information Section, Federal Reserve
Bank ofSan Francisco,'P.O. B'o,x 7702, San Francisco 94120. Phone (415) 974~2246.